Commercial Transactions by Krahmer, John
SMU Law Review
Volume 42




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation





HREE developments suggest that the 1987 Survey period will be
remembered as a watershed year in the development of Texas com-
mercial law. First, the Texas Supreme Court created at least two new
theories of action in commercial litigation. I Second, application of the Uni-
form Commercial Code2 was broader in certain factual or legal settings.3
Third, Texas courts rejected various rules developed in some earlier com-
mercial cases.4 These developments occurred against the backdrop of a very
active year in commercial transaction litigation.' This Article collects and
* B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University. Professor of Law, Texas
Tech University.
1. See Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987)
(general duty of good faith and fair dealing can arise as result of special relationship between
parties governed or created by contract); Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349
(Tex. 1987) (warranty of good workmanship arises as part of contract to repair tangible
goods).
2. The Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted in Texas as TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter referred to
as the Code].
3. The Code was applied by analogy to a contract dispute in Lassiter v. Rotogravure
Committee, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 8, 9-10 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (parol evi-
dence allowed between immediate parties to show that contract had been signed in representa-
tive capacity), and in a previously unlitigated setting in Cullen Frost Bank v. Dallas
Sportswear Co., 730 S.W.2d 668, 669-70 (Tex. 1987) (right of secured party to compel and
supervise collection of accounts receivable by debtor). The Code was also applied by analogy
in numerous fact variations testing the scope of the rule of "commercial reasonableness" in the
disposition of collateral. See, e.g., Myers v. Ginsburg, 735 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1987, no writ) (failure of landlord to sell collateral securing lien in commercially rea-
sonable time); Carroll v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 734 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ) (burden of proving commercial reasonableness is on creditor,
failure to carry burden bars creditor from recovering deficiency); Carroll v. Kennon, 734
S.W.2d 34, 37-41 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, no writ) (notice of sale to debtors is question of
fact, creditor may be barred from recovering deficiency because of failure to give notice);
Knight v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 728 S.W.2d 480, 482-83 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1987, no writ) (improper disposition or retention of collateral bars creditor from recov-
ering deficiency).
4. The cases of Cantu v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 716 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1986), writ ref'd n.r.e., per curiam, 723 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1987), and Cluck v. Frost
Nat'l Bank, 714 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) held there was
no duty of good faith or fair dealing in actions for breach of contract under Texas law. The
decision in Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987), is
clearly contrary to this broad rejection of the theory. G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d
392, 393 (Tex. 1982), permitting the disclaimer of implied warranties in the sale of a dwelling,
was overruled on this issue in Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 355 (Tex.
1987).
5. During the last several Survey periods, the number of commercial cases decided each
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discusses several of these cases, including brief discussion of related matters
affecting commercial practice.6 The topical organization parallels that of the
Texas Business & Commerce Code. 7
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. Acceleration and Foreclosure
Notices Required for Proper Acceleration and Foreclosure. The sequence of
legally required notices for a proper acceleration has become well established
in Texas during the last few years.8 A variation on the problem of legally
required notices is whether the failure of a creditor to give contractually re-
quired notices invalidates the acceleration or gives rise to an action for dam-
ages. In Jasper Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Reddell 9 the lender
was contractually required to give the debtor notice of a right to reinstate
and of a right to bring an action to assert defenses to the acceleration. The
lender gave the legally required notices of intent to accelerate and notice of
acceleration, but omitted the contractual notices. The debtors, however, had
actual notice of their right of reinstatement and right to assert defenses be-
cause of a consultation they had with their own attorney. The court held
that actual notice was sufficient to comply with the contractual requirements
of the deed of trust because only the relationship between the debtor and the
creditor was involved.10 The court distinguished the circumstance in which
notice to third parties was a necessary part of the notification process. '1
The issue of contractually required notices appeared in Knight v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp.,12 in which a security agreement required the se-
year has averaged between 40 and 50; during this Survey period, more than 75 commercial
cases were reported.
6. Related subjects include the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1988), the TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0036 (Vernon
Supp. 1988), and the Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1979 & Supp. IV
1986).
7. The chapters in the Code are organized as follows: Chapter 1, General Provisions;
Chapter 2, Sales; Chapter 3, Commercial Paper; Chapter 4, Bank Deposits and Collections;
Chapter 5, Letters of Credit; Chapter 6, Bulk Sales; Chapter 7, Documents of Title; Chapter 8,
Investment Securities; and Chapter 9, Secured Transactions.
8. The best statement of the notice requirements is probably found in Baldazo v. Villa
Oldsmobile, Inc., 695 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ). There, the court
noted that if a secured promissory note grants the holder an option to accelerate the note upon
the maker's default, equitable principles require the holder to give notice of several events.
The holder must make presentation of the note and demand payment of all past due install-
ments prior to acceleration. The holder must further advise the maker that acceleration will
occur and the entire balance will be due and payable if the maker fails to cure the delinquency.
If payment of the delinquency is not forthcoming, the holder must give the maker notice that
acceleration has occurred. Once notice is served, the debtor can no longer cure the default.
The entire debt becomes due and payable. "Notice that the debt has been accelerated has no
legal effect unless preceded by notice that the debt will be accelerated." Id. at 817.
9. 730 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1987).
10. Id. at 675.
11. 730 S.W.2d at 674. The court noted the statutory twenty-one-day notice requirement
of TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon 1984) as an example of a notice requirement that
operates both to protect the debtor by providing a period for cure and to serve the public
interest by publicizing the sale in hopes of increasing interest in bidding.
12. 728 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
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cured party to give "reasonable notification of the time and place of any
public or private sale."' 3 The secured party admitted that it did not give
notice of the time and place of the private sale at which the collateral was
sold, but argued that it had complied with the statutory notice require-
ments 14 by giving notice of the time after which a private sale would occur. '5
There was no evidence that the debtor had actual knowledge of the time and
place of sale. The court held that failure to give the contractually required
notice barred the creditor from recovering a deficiency under the rule of
Tanenbaum v. Economics Laboratory, Inc. 16 Jasper and Knight provide a
useful review in the area of contractual, instead of statutory, notices.
Inequitable Conduct May Preclude Acceleration. In addition to the limits on
acceleration that may exist because of surrounding notice requirements, a
more fundamental limit is whether the creditor is guilty of inequitable con-
duct in the acceleration of a debt. In Davis v. Pletcher 17 the court found that
the debtor had made good faith attempts to obtain resolution of a dispute
about the quantity of land to be conveyed under the deed in question, includ-
ing a tender of installments to the registry of court pending the outcome of
the dispute.' 8 The court also found that the debtor had spent considerable
sums on improvements to the land. 19 Under these circumstances, the court
held that the acceleration by the creditor was not for the purpose of protect-
ing the debt or its security, but was, instead, an inequitable action used to
coerce payment and to avoid a decision on the merits of the underlying dis-
pute.20 The court ruled the attempted acceleration was a nullity. 21
B. Good Faith
Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. In English v. Fischer22 the Texas
Supreme Court held there was no implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in every contract in Texas. 23 Unfortunately, the court used some
hyperbole in reaching this conclusion 24 and the rhetorical language began to
13. Id. at 483.
14. The statutory notice requirements are set out in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1988) which provides, "[R]easonable notification of the
time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private
sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor
... I I d.
15. 728 S.W.2d at 483.
16. 628 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. 1982). Other cases decided during the Survey period under
the Tanenbaum rule are discussed in the text infra at notes 288-289.
17. 727 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
18. Id. at 31.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 35-36.
21. Id. at 36.
22. 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983).
23. Id. at 524.
24. In the course of its opinion, the court discussed the theory of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in the following terms:
This concept [of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing] is con-
trary to our well-reasoned and long-established adversary system which has
served us ably in Texas for almost 150 years. Our system permits parties who
1988]
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lead a life of its own. In the process, the language obscured the actual hold-
ing of the court and courts cited the case for the proposition that there was
no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in any contract in
Texas. 25
In Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co.2 6 the supreme
court clarified and broadened the role of good faith and fair dealing by hold-
ing that, at least in the context of insurance contracts, an insurer owes a duty
of good faith and fair dealing to its insured and that a cause of action will lie
for breach of this duty. According to the court,
[A] duty of good faith and fair dealing may arise as a result of a special
relationship between the parties governed or created by a contract.
A cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
is stated when it is alleged that there is no reasonable basis for denial of
a claim or delay in payment or a failure on the part of the insurer to
determine whether there is any reasonable basis for the denial or
delay.27
A logical development from Arnold is recognition that the Code provides
inter alia, that "[e]very contract or duty within the title imposes an obliga-
tion of good faith in its performance or enforcement" 2 and further provides,
"[a]ny right or obligation declared by this title is enforceable by action un-
less the provision declaring it specifies a different and limited effect."'29
C, Accord and Satisfaction
"Payment in Full" Must Be Brought Home to Creditor. The traditional com-
mon law view recognizes an effective accord and satisfaction between a
debtor and a creditor if the debtor clearly informs the creditor that a pay-
have a dispute over a contract to present their case to an impartial tribunal for a
determination of the agreement as made by the parties and embodied in the
contract itself. To adopt the laudatory sounding theory of "good faith and fair
dealing" would place a party under the onerous threat of treble damages should
he seek to compel his adversary to perform according to the contract terms as
agreed upon by the parties. The novel concept advocated by the courts below
would abolish our system of government according to settled rules of law and let
each case be decided upon what might seem "fair and in good faith," by each
fact finder. This we are unwilling to do.
Id. at 522.
25. Cantu v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 716 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986),
writ ref'd n.r.e., per curiam, 723 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1987), and Cluck v. Frost Nat'l Bank, 714
S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), both quoted the paragraph set
out supra in note 28 as a ground for their decision. In the per curiam refusal of a writ of error
in Cantu, the supreme court noted Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 725
S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987), as the proper interpretation of English. See 723 S.W.2d at 668.
26. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
27. Id. at 167.
28. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
29. Id. § 1.106(b). A recent example of a cause of action based on these Code provisions
can be found in Reid v. Key Bank of Southern Maine, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1665 (1st Cir.
1987). Although decided under the law of Maine, the Code provisions in Texas are identical
on this point and the question was one of first impression in that jurisdiction. The rule in
Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987), could easily be
extended along the lines of the court's reasoning in Reid.
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ment is being tendered in full payment of a debt. 30 Texas, along with a
majority of American jurisdictions, adopted this general rule.31 The enact-
ment of section 1.207 of the Code raised the possibility that a creditor might
be able to avoid the effect of the common law rule by accepting such a pay-
ment under protest and thereby reserve the right to sue at a later time for
any unpaid balance. 32 While some Texas cases have continued to apply the
pre-Code law of accord and satisfaction, 33 Pileco, Inc. v. HC1, Inc. ,34 is the
first decision in Texas to squarely address the issue of whether section 1.207
overturns the common law rule.
In Pileco the back of a check contained the statement, "By signature
hereto, endorser acknowledges full, complete and final settlement of all
claims against payer."'35 The creditor cashed the check after adding the
words "Under Protest" as part of its indorsement and then sent a letter to
the debtor demanding payment of alleged unpaid interest. 36 The creditor
argued that the addition of the "Under Protest" language preserved its right
to sue for any unpaid balance under section 1.207 of the Code. 37 The court
held the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction survived the enact-
ment of the Code and that under the common law, a creditor could not
simultaneously accept the benefit of a payment and reject a "Payment in
Full" condition accompanying the payment.38 A creditor must reject the
entire tender of payment and return the check to avoid an accord and satis-
faction. The creditor's attempt to use section 1.207 to avoid an accord and
satisfaction defense by placing the phrase "Under Protest" on the check was
ineffective. 39
Two other cases decided during the Survey period addressed other aspects
of the accord and satisfaction defense.4°
30. See Gold, Accord and Satisfaction by Estoppel, 27 IOWA L. REV. 31 (1941-42) (excel-
lent discussion and extensive citation of authority on accord and satisfaction).
31. See First State Bank v. Knapp, 3 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1928, no
writ); Stetson-Preston Co. v. H.S. Dodson & Co., 103 S.W. 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, no writ).
32. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.207 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1986) provides, inter
alia: "A party who with explicit reservation of rights ... assents to performance in a manner
demanded or offered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved."
33. E.g., Hixon v. Cox, 633 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (pre-
Code law continues to apply in cases of payment by check for services rendered; question left
often whether rule for payment by check for goods delivered changed by Code); Roylex, Inc. v.
S. & B. Engineers, Inc., 592 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ) (pre-Code
law applied but without discussion of whether Code had displaced common law).
34. 735 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 562.
38. Id. at 562-63.
39. Id. at 563.
40. Tex-Goober Co. v. Los Angeles Nut House, Inc., 803 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1986) (must
be unmistakable communication to creditor that check is being tendered as full accord and
satisfaction; letter held ambiguous on whether such tender was being made); Talamas v. Bressi
Int'l, 727 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (burden of proving every
element of alleged accord and satisfaction is on defendant; insufficient evidence shown to raise





Creation and Disclaimer of Implied Warranties. The Texas law of warranty
has undergone considerable change since the adoption of the Code, and it
has been clear for some time that the interaction between the Code, the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act,41 and the common law has been grad-
ually moving in the direction of increased warranty coverage. 42 There has
been a clear trend toward the expansion of warranty coverage beyond the
sale of goods transactions covered by the Commercial Code into transactions
involving the sale of homes and related construction. This trend continued
with the controversial decision in Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v.
41. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987).
42. The following summary helps to discern the movement toward increased warranty
protection:
As implied warranty of habitability and good workmanship runs from the builder to the
original purchaser of a dwelling. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); Kamarach
v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978). The warranty continues to run even if the builder
lives in the dwelling for several years before selling it. March v. Thiery, 729 S.W.2d 889 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ). The implied warranty of habitability and good work-
manship also runs from the original builder to purchasers of a used home. Gupta v. Ritter
Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983).
There are actually two warranties imposed in the construction of a dwelling: a warranty of
habitability and a warranty of good workmanship, a breach of either warranty can give rise to
an action for damages. Evans v. J. Stiles, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. 1985). The warranty of
good workmanship extends to peripheral construction as well as to the dwelling itself. Kish v.
Van Note, 692 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1985) (swimming pool); Thrall v. Renno, 695 S.W.2d 84
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (brick patio).
At the same time this series of cases was being decided, the Texas courts were also consider-
ing the related issues of warranty disclaimers and limitations of remedy in light of the DTPA.
The path of development in this area is less clear, but movement can be seen. A summary is
also helpful here:
A clear and conspicuous disclaimer of warranties or limitation of remedy that is effective
under the Code is also effective under the DTPA. Ellmer v. Delaware Mini-Computer Sys-
tems, 665 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ); Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v.
Young, 720 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ). In the case of
warranties of habitability and good workmanship, the disclaimer need not even meet Code
standards of conspicuousness. G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982), Mc-
Crea v. Cubilla Condominium Corp., 685 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
While disclaimers may be effective to disclaim an action for breach of an implied warranty,
express warranty claims may survive the disclaimer under the standards of section 2.316(a) of
the Code and serve as the basis for a recovery under the DTPA. Singleton v. LaCoure, 712
S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mercedes-Benz of
North Am., Inc. v. Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
Limitation of liability clauses, as contrasted to disclaimers, are not effective to waive the
right to maintain a DTPA action because of the antiwaiver provision of TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon 1987). Martin v. Lou Poliquin Enterprises, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 180
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
While disclaimers may be effective to bar actions founded on sources of law outside the
DTPA, they have no effect on DTPA causes of action because of the anti-waiver provisions of
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon 1987). Mercedes-Benz of North Am., Inc. v.
Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ); Metro Ford Truck Sales,
Inc. v. Davis, 709 S.W.2d 785, opinion on rehearing, 711 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1986, no writ); Reliance Universal, Inc. v. Sparks Indus. Servs., Inc., 688 S.W.2d 890 (Tex.




The facts in Melody are easy to understand. The plaintiffs purchased a
manufactured home from the defendant. Two years after moving in, the
plaintiffs discovered that a drain had not been connected to one of the sinks
and the resulting leakage had seriously damaged the sheetrock, the insula-
tion and the flooring. The plaintiffs contacted the defendant to make repairs.
After two attempts at repair, the situation was worse than before because of
damage caused during the repair work and because of the failure to recon-
nect a washing machine that subsequently flooded and caused harm to the
carpeting, cabinets, and floors. The plaintiffs prevailed in the lower courts in
an action brought on an implied warranty theory under the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (DTPA).44 On appeal the Texas Supreme Court held that
contracts to repair or modify tangible goods or property carry with them an
implied warranty to make the repairs or modifications in a good and work-
manlike manner.45 The court took pains to describe this new warranty in
terms that would measure the quality of repair services according to the
standards applied to persons skilled in the particular trade or occupation,
not by a guarantee of results.4 6 While the creation of a new and far-reaching
43. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987). The reader should be alerted that the court issued two
opinions in Melody; only the second was actually released for official publication and it is this
second opinion that is discussed in the text. The first opinion was designated as "Not for
Publication" pending the result of a motion for rehearing and appears unofficially at 30 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 489 (June 17, 1987). This opinion was withdrawn and replaced by the second
opinion at 741 S.W.2d 349 (1987). Some elements of the first opinion are mentioned, infra, in
these footnotes because of their intrinsic legal interest.
44. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987).
45. 741 S.W.2d at 354. In the first Melody opinion, the court had ruled that "all service
providers impliedly warrant that their services will be performed in a good and workmanlike
manner." Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 489, 491 (June 17, 1987).
The warranty statement in the second opinion is considerably narrower. In the first opinion,
the court also extended the warranty to the rendition of professional services, id. at 491, over-
ruling the decision in Dennis v. Allison, 698 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1981) (no implied warranty in
doctor's psychiatric treatment of patient). In the second opinion the court said, "The question
whether an implied warranty applies to services in which the essence of the transaction is the
exercise of professional judgment by the service provider is not before us," 741 S.W.2d at 354,
noting Dennis in passing, but not overruling it. One implication of this change in the second
opinion is that the issue of warranties in service transaction is still open, but with two distinct
branches: (1) service transactions that do not involve "professional judgment" and (2) profes-
sional services. Future litigation will no doubt test the grey area between the first and second
opinions in Melody.
46. 741 S.W.2d at 354-55. The court is walking a fine line on this point and the ramifica-
tions of this attempt to define the warranty in terms of the quality of the work performed are
not discussed in the opinion. Questions will arise in at least three areas, two of them legal and
one of them practical. The first area is that of pleading and proof. If an aggrieved plaintiff
sued for improper repair under theories other than breach of warranty, the plaintiff would
have the burden of showing how the repair was deficient. In a breach of warranty suit the
plaintiff would need only show that the repair was ineffective to make a prima facie case. The
defendant would then have the burden of showing how a properly performed repair was none-
theless ineffective, not an impossible burden, but certainly a difficult one. The second area is
related to the first. Even though courts and lawyers can draw fine distinctions about repair
work that is properly done, yet ineffective as to final results, the practical effect of explaining
fine distinctions to juries is problematic. The third area is that of the applicable statute of
limitations. The court phrased the warranty in Melody as one "available to consumers suing
under the DTPA." 741 S.W.2d at 354. If this means that the warranty is only available in
DTPA actions, the statute of limitations issue is simple enough since the claim would fall
1988]
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warranty is striking enough, the court went even further and held that the
warranty of good and workmanlike repair cannot be waived or disclaimed. 47
On the disclaimer issue, the court overturned its earlier decision in the case
of G- W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux.48 A concurring opinion 49 by Justice Gonzalez
strongly disagreed with the action of the court in creating a new warranty
and overruling the G-W-L decision. The concurrence argued that existing
theories of recovery, including breach of contract or the recognized cause of
action for the negligent performance of a contract, were adequate to uphold
the decision below and did not require the extension of warranty coverage.50
In the short term, the Melody decision will generate considerable litigation
about the scope of the new warranty as well as raising questions about the
validity of disclaimers in other, related, contexts. In the long term, perhaps
the most significant aspect of the Melody decision is the degree to which it
illustrates a further blending of contract and tort, a "contort," to use Grant
Gilmore's expressive term. 51 Eventually, the interaction between the law of
contract, the law of tort and the DTPA will require unification and rationali-
zation by the courts and by the legislature. That time, perhaps, is almost
here.
Recovery for Negligent Performance of Repairs. In a case 52 that throws an
interesting sidelight on Melody, a homeowner recovered $150 from a
plumber for damage caused to an airconditioner during the course of repairs
within the two-year limitations period of TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.56A (Vernon.
1987). One difficulty, however, in stating the warranty in this fashion is that other warranty
claims can be maintained as either a DTPA action, if brought within the two-year limitations
period, or as a contract action, if brought beyond the two-year period. The author believes it
unlikely that the warranty of repair can stand as the only warranty conditionally restricted to
DTPA actions because the distinction is artificial. As such, other warranties may be brought
under the same condition, for example, the warranties of habitability or good and workmanlike
construction, or, as is more likely, the warranty of repair will be expanded by removal of the
DTPA condition. Here again, whichever result eventually occurs, further litigation can be
predicted.
47. 741 S.W.2d at 355. As with the statement creating the warranty of repair that it is
"available to consumers suing under the DTPA," 741 S.W.2d at 354, the author believes it
unlikely that the antidisclaimer ruling will remain restricted to the warranty of repair. See
supra note 46. While it is possible that disclaimers of the warranty of repair will eventually be
allowed, a much more likely result will be the gradual extension of the antidisclaimer rule to
other warranty claims brought under the DTPA, a position almost reached already in some
lower court decisions. See Mercedes-Benz of North Am., Inc. v. Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d 844
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ); Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Davis, 709 S.W.2d
785, opinion on rehearing, 711 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ); Reliance
Universal, Inc. v. Sparks Indus. Servs., Inc., 688 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. 643 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1982). In overruling G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, the court
stated, "To the extent that it conflicts with this opinion, we overrule G-W-L, Inc. v.
Robichaux." 741 S.W.2d at 355 (citation omitted). This limited overruling open the door to
litigation about the scope of the antidisclaimer rule discussed supra in note 46.
49. 741 S.W.2d at 356-61.
50. Id. at 358-59. The concurrence is more sensitive than the majority to the problems of
proof arising from the description of the warranty of repair in terms of the quality of the work
performed instead of in terms of the traditional warranty view of the quality of the end result.
See 741 S.W.2d at 359-61.
51. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 90 (1974).
52. Rocha v. Merritt, 734 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, no writ).
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to the plumbing system of a house. The homeowner's cause of action was
based on the negligent performance of services under a contract, a form of
action approved in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck.5 3 The home-
owner also sought recovery of attorney's fees as part of the claim and, on
this point, the court held that the negligent "performance of services... may
be characterized as a claim in contract and/or tort."' 54 As a contract claim,
the court held that attorney's fees were properly recoverable. 55
Express Warranties of Workmanship. In addition to implied warranties of
habitability and good workmanship, express warranties can also arise in con-
struction cases. In Wood v. Component Construction Corp. 16 a contractor
succeeded in maintaining a DTPA action against a subcontractor that had
expressly warranted its workmanship.
Express Warranties in the Sale of Goods. In a non-DTPA case, 57 the plaintiff
cotton farmers sued for breach of an express warranty in the sale of herbi-
cide and challenged the validity of a limitation of remedies clause on the
ground that the limitation was unconscionable. 58 The plaintiffs succeeded in
showing a breach of the warranty, but were unsuccessful on the issue of
unconscionability. 59 The court believed that the large-scale fanning opera-
tions of the plaintiffs made it appropriate to consider the contract as one
made in a commercial setting.6° As a commercial contract, the court found
the limitation of liability to be conscionable because it simply allocated risks
between the parties in an arm's-length bargain regarding the efficacy of the
product.61 The court limited damages to the difference in the value of the
product as warranted and the value of the product as delivered.62
53. 146 Tex. 153, 157, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510 (1947).
54. 734 S.W.2d at 148. A true "contort." Gilmore would be pleased. But see Farina v.
Southwestern Bell Media, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 826 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (negligent performance of
contract is tort claim; no liability for failure to publish advertising in telephone directory). The
court noted it was not bound by decisions of the Texas courts of appeals and chose not to
follow Ruben H. Donnelly Corp. v. McKinnon, 688 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (failure to publish advertising in telephone directory actionable as negli-
gent performance of contract). On similar facts about the failure to publish advertising in a
telephone directory, a limitation of liability clause was upheld in Calarco v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 725 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which the
court distinguished Donnelly because the plaintiff sued for breach of contract instead of suing
for negligent performance of contract and DTPA violations.
55. 734 S.W.2d at 148-49. Attorney's fees in contract actions are recoverable under TEX.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1986).
56. 722 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
57. Lindemann v. Eli Lilly & Co., 816 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1987).
58. Id. at 202.
59. Id. at 202-05.
60. Id. at 204.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 205.
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B. Good Faith Purchase
Authority to Sell Critical to Passage of Title. In an interesting pair of cases, 63
the issue of an agent's authority to sell goods was the critical point in deter-
mining whether a good faith purchaser obtained a title that was good against
the owner. In one case the owner recovered the goods because of a proven
lack of authority to sell on the part of the agent, but only after reimbursing
the purchaser for the entire purchase price paid to the defaulting agent.64 In
the other case, the buyer successfully opposed a motion for summary judg-
ment in favor of the owner by showing a sufficient factual basis to justify
trial on the question of the authority of the agent to sell the goods.65
C. Suspension of Performance
Change of Circumstance Must Be Objective and Must Occur After the Time
of Contracting. Under section 2.609 of the Code66 a party may suspend per-
formance of a contract if there are reasonable grounds for insecurity about
whether the other party will perform. In Universal Resources Corp. v. Pan-
handle Eastern Pipe Line Co. 67 the court held that a gas buyer did not have
reasonable grounds to justify suspension of performance when the only
change in circumstance from the time the parties originally signed the con-
tract was a subjective redetermination based on the buyer's reassessment of
the gas production properties of the seller.68
D. Revocation of Acceptance
Revocation Allowed When Malfunctions Cause Equipment to Be of No Value
to the Buyer. Section 2.608 of Code69 replaces the common law action of
63. Cash v. Lebowitz, 734 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Andy
Mach. Co. v. Hofstadter, 721 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
64. Andy Mach. Co. v. Hofstadter, 721 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no
writ).
65. Cash v. Lebowitz, 734 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Cash
involved the additional element of the failure of the parties to transfer the certificate of title to
the goods involved in the sale (an automobile). Although the Certificate of Title Act, TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1, § 33 (Vernon 1977), makes such sales void, the court held
that the sale could be valid as between immediate parties because the purpose of the act is to
void sales that would divest the true owner of title to the vehicle. 734 S.W.2d at 398. If the
true owner was a party to the sale, the purpose of the Act was not violated. This holding is
consistent with earlier decisions under the Act. E.g., Drake Ins. Co. v. King, 606 S.W.2d 812
(Tex. 1980); Everett v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 653 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1983, no writ).
66. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.609(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides, in
part: "When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either
party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he
receives such assurance may if commercially reasonably suspend any performance for which
he has not already received the agreed return."
67. 813 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1987).
68. Id. at 79.
69. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.608 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) states that:
(a) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose
non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it
(1) on the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured and it
has not been seasonably cured; or
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rescission,70 although many courts and attorneys continue to use the older
term to describe a claim by the buyer to return the parties to the status quo
ante. In Bivens Winchester Corp. v. Poteet 71 the court allowed revocation of
acceptance when an automatic car washer consistently malfunctioned after
installation by tearing off mirrors and antennas, by trapping occupants in
their vehicles due to stalling in the middle of the "run," and by failing to
stop vehicles at the end of the track. Because the jury found that the equip-
ment had a value of zero dollars to the buyer, the court did not reach the
question of whether section 2.608 allows a seller to counterclaim for such
value as the goods may have had to the buyer. 72 The seller argued that the
goods did not comprise a "commercial unit" and that the buyer could not,
therefore, revoke acceptance of equipment components that did work prop-
erly.73 The court held the jury's finding that the equipment was a commer-
cial unit was not against the weight of the evidence because the contract had
been negotiated as an integrated automatic car washer and the seller itself
had treated the equipment as a single unit.74
E. Damages
Lost Profit Claims. Section 2.708(b) of the Code75 covers two distinct types
of lost profit cases. One is that of a seller engaged in the sale of standard
priced goods who loses sales volume because of the buyer's breach. 76 The
other is that of a seller who stops production of goods being specially manu-
factured for the buyer. 77 The case of Malone v. Carl Kisabeth Co.78 is in-
structive on why a lost volume seller should be sure that special issues
submitted to the jury accurately reflect the elements of a lost profits recovery
under section 2.708(b) of the Code. 79 Several things went awry for the seller
(2) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably
induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's
assurances.
70. The comment to § 2.608 says inter alia:
The section no longer speaks of "rescission," a term capable of ambiguous appli-
cation either to transfer of title to the goods or to the contract of sale and sus-
ceptible also of confusion with cancellation for cause of an executed or
executory portion of the contract. The under this section is instead referred to
simply as "revocation of acceptance" of goods tendered under a contract for sale
and involves no suggestion of "election" of any sort.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.608 comment I (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
71. 720 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
72. Id. at 661.
73. Id. at 662. A "commercial unit" is defined in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.105(f) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) as "such a unit of goods as by commercial usage is a
single whole for purposes of sale and division of which materially impairs its character or value
on the market or in use."
74. 720 S.W.2d at 662-63.
75. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.708(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
76. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 284-88 (2d ed. 1980).
77. Id.
78. 726 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
79. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.708(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) permits the
recovery of lost profits whenever the usual measure of the difference between the market price
and the unpaid contract price are inadequate to compensate the seller for the breach. Accord-
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in Malone. The first problem was an instruction that led the jury to miscal-
culate the amount of lost profits. 80 Because the buyer had accepted and paid
for some goods before the contract was breached, the instruction should not
have included the goods already paid for as a part of the calculation base.8 '
By including them, the seller was, in effect, receiving a double profit on the
goods already accepted. 82 The second problem was even more serious. The
seller did not request a special finding that it was a lost volume seller. 83 The
failure to obtain this finding amounted to a waiver of that ground as a basis
for recovery and the buyer was, therefore, entitled to credit for the resale of
the goods (which resale was at the contract price).84 The third problem in-
volved the recovery of "incidental damages" for storage and care of the re-
jected goods.85 On this issue, the court held there was inadequate evidence
to show that the seller had incurred any expense for storage.86 The only
testimony was by the seller's president that the goods were stored in the
seller's own showroom and his estimate of the value of such storage, but
there was no evidence linking this testimony to any expenses incurred by the
seller for storing other goods elsewhere or foreclosing the seller from using
the space for its own storage requirements.8 7 Since section 2.710 allows the
seller to recover for "expenses reasonably incurred, '88 the court held that a
failure to show an actual incurring of expenses was fatal to this portion of
the seller's claim.89 The dissent would allow the seller to recover for the
reasonable value of the storage space without the requirement of showing
out-of-pocket expense or loss.90 The court entered a take-nothing judgment
against the seller. 9'
The second type of lost profits claim is exemplified by Stewart & Stevenson
Services, Inc. v. Enserve, Inc.92 where a seller stopped production of well-
service pumps after the buyer's breach. The stoppage was appropriate be-
cause of a collapse in the oil field equipment market making it highly un-
likely that the pumps could be sold if they were completed.93 The court
ing to the Comment, "This section permits the recovery of lost profits in all appropriate cases,
which would include all standard priced goods." Id. § 2.708 comment 2.
80. 726 S.W.2d at 189-90.
81. Id.
82. Id. The proper method of proving lost profits damages for an aggrieved seller is dis-
cussed at length in Fleming Mfg. Co. v. Capitol Brick, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (proof must show lost profits with reasonable certainty).
83. 726 S.W.2d at 190.
84. Id. at 190-91.
85. Incidental damages are specifically allowed by TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.§ 2.708(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) and defined in id. § 2.710 to include such items as
commercially reasonable charges for transportation, for care and custody of goods after the
buyer's breach, and for return or resale of the goods.
86. 726 S.W.2d at 191-92.
87. Id. at 192.
88. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.710 comment (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
89. 726 S.W.2d at 192.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 719 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
93. Id. at 343.
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found no prior Texas cases applying section 2.708(b) 94 in these circum-
stances, but did find precedent in other jurisdictions applying this provision
of the Code in disintegrating market situations95 and allowed the seller to
recover damages on this theory.96 The court also properly held that under
the Code, the contract did not fail for indefiniteness because it left open the
price and the delivery terms.97
Proving Sale and Delivery. In Peregrine Metals Group, Inc. v. Leervig9s the
court held that a seller was entitled to introduce bills of lading, shipping
receipts, and letters from the buyer admitting the debt as part of the seller's
proof that goods had actually been sold and delivered to the buyer. 99 For
reasons that are not clear in the opinion, the trial court had allowed testi-
mony about how these documents were prepared and the function they
served, but refused to admit the documents themselves and instructed a ver-
dict against the seller. 10 The court of appeals ruled this was error and re-
manded the case since there was some evidence showing that delivery was
made and an instructed verdict was, therefore, improper. 0 1
Some Appeals are Better Left Alone. Everyone has days like this. The plain-
tiff-appellant in West v. Jack Criswell Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. 102 bought a used
Pontiac from the appellee and also purchased a credit life and warranty ser-
vice policy at the same time. There were numerous immediate problems
with the car and, within two weeks, the appellant traded-in the Pontiac on a
somewhat newer Mercury. The appellant again purchased credit life and
warranty service for this vehicle. By mistake, the appellee failed to refund
the premiums for the earlier credit life and warranty policies. When he dis-
covered the error, the appellee promptly tendered the amounts due to the
appellant's attorney, but the tender was refused.
At trial, the court found that the parties had agreed to rescind the original
contract for the purchase of the Pontiac and awarded the appellant $1,600 in
damages plus attorney's fees of $3,000. 103 Appellant was dissatisfied with
this award and appealed on the ground that recovery had been sought under
the DTPA and not for rescission. 04 The appellant also contended that the
trial court had erred in calculating damages by refusing to double some of
the damages under the DTPA, but did not assert as error the trial court's
94. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.708(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
95. 719 S.W.2d at 343. The cases cited were Timber Access Indus. Co. v. U.S. Plywood-
Champion Papers, Inc., 263 Or. 509, 503 P.2d 482, 490 (1972), and Stanfill v. TAT (U.S.A.)
Corp., 76 Or. App. 332, 709 P.2d 717, 718 (1985).
96. 719 S.W.2d at 344.
97. Id. at 345-46. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.305(a), 2.309(a) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968) are the provisions dealing with open price and open delivery terms.
98. 734 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, no writ).
99. Id. at 123.
100. Id. at 122.
101. Id. at 123.
102. 721 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
103. 721 S.W.2d at 500-01.
104. Id. at 501.
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finding that there had been no DTPA violation.10 5 The third point of error
was that the trial court had erred in calculating the damages to which the
appellant was entitled "under any theory of recovery."' 0 6 The court of ap-
peals agreed with appellant that the trial court should not have entered a
judgment based on rescission since that had neither been pleaded nor
tried. 0 7 The court of appeals also agreed with appellant that the trial court
erred in calculating damages "under any theory of recovery" since rescission
was not a proper ground of recovery and the appellant had not appealed the
ruling that there was no DTPA violation.108 Because the trial court based
its award on an improper theory, damages based on rescission could not
stand and, because there was no DTPA violation, no damages and no attor-
neys fees could be awarded on that basis either.1°9 The appellate court re-
versed the judgment of the trial court and rendered a take-nothing judgment
against the appellant." 0
Damages for Loss of Use. In Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v. Gray"' the plain-
tiff fared better on a claim based on another automobile purchase. While
there was a failure of proof on some issues," 12 the plaintiff was successful in
recovering damages for loss of use as measured by the cost of buying another
car as a substitute for the original, unusable vehicle." 3 The court allowed
this measure of damages on the authority of the leading case of Luna v.
North Star Dodge Sales, Inc.,' '4 in which the rental cost of another vehicle
was used as the measure of damage. The court in Town East noted that the
purchase price of another car was actually a lower measure of damages on
the facts before it than the cost of renting another vehicle." 5
E. Statute of Limitations
Calculation of Time of Breach Can Be an Issue of Material Fact. Under





109. Id. at 501-02.
110. Id. at 502.
111. 730 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
112. The court held that the plaintiff-buyer had failed to prove the market value of the
defective vehicle, 730 S.W.2d at 801-03. Proof of market value was successfully shown, how-
ever, in another cased decided during the Survey period. See McCann v. Brown, 725 S.W.2d
822 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ). The court also held the buyer had failed to prove
damages for mental anguish allegedly suffered as a result of the transaction, 730 S.W.2d at
803-04. The court noted that the plaintiff's proof of mental anguish fell far short of the proof
offered by the plaintiff in Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. 1984),
the seminal case on mental anguish recovery in consumer transactions under the DTPA.
113. 730 S.W.2d at 804-05.
114. 667 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Tex. 1984).
115. 730 S.W.2d at 804.
116. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides, in
part:
(b) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the ag-
grieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs
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breach occurs, which is generally upon tender of delivery of the goods, but
when a warranty explicitly extends to future performance, the cause of ac-
tion does not accrue until the breach is or should have been discovered. In
these latter instances, the date when the four-year statute of limitations be-
gins to run is an issue of fact that may defeat a motion for summary judg-
ment. Such a situation arose in Trunkline LNG Co. v. Trane Thermal Co. 117
in which the court remanded the case for trial because part of an installment
contract extended to the future performance of the goods and summary
judgment evidence was inadequate to determine when the cause of action
arose.I 18
In another statute of limitations case, Muss v. Mercedes-Benz ofN.Am., 1 9
more than four years had passed since delivery of the goods, but the buyer
argued that an agreement by the seller to make repairs for two years follow-
ing delivery amounted to a warranty as to the future performance of the
goods. Under this argument, the limitations period was essentially six years
rather than four years. The court reviewed the earlier case of Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Certainteed Corp.' 20 and concluded that the contract clause
was only a promise by the seller to make repairs rather than an explicit
warranty that the goods would comply in the future with some standard of
performance.12' The warranty claim was, therefore, time-barred.122 On this
point the case is more carefully reasoned than Trunkline since some lan-
guage in Trunkline suggests that an agreement to repair may operate to ex-
tend the statute of limitations. 23 This issue was not squarely before the
court in Trunkline, however, because of the installment nature of the con-
tract involved in that case. 124
The buyer in Muss also asserted a DTPA claim based on the failure to
repair. The court concluded, however, that this claim was barred by the
running of the applicable two-year statute of limitations. 125
III. COMMERCIAL PAPER
A. Form and Validity of Instruments
Instrument Must Be Unconditional. To be negotiable under section 3.104,126
an instrument must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum
when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends
to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the
time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or
should have been discovered.
117. 722 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
118. Id. at 725.
119. 734 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
120. 710 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1986). The court noted that the supreme court had held in
Safeway that emphasis should be placed on the term "explicitly" in considering cases under
§ 2.725(b). See Muss, 734 S.W.2d at 158; Safeway, 710 S.W.2d at 548.
121. Muss, 734 S.W.2d at 158.
122. Id.
123. 722 S.W.2d at 725.
124. Id.
125. 734 S.W.2d at 160.
126. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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certain. 127 If the promise or order is conditional, the instrument is nonnego-
tiable and the maker or drawer may be relieved of liability on the instrument
if the condition is not fulfilled. 12 8 In Sun Exploration & Production Co. v.
Benton 129 the Texas Supreme Court held that a provision in a draft specify-
ing that it was payable "15 days after sight and upon approval of title" was a
condition precedent to liability on the draft. 130 The failure of the grantor to
convey a valid title to the land in question allowed the grantee to avoid lia-
bility on the draft. 131
Instrument Must Be Signed by the Maker or Drawer. Also under section
3.104,132 an instrument must be signed by the maker or drawer to become a
negotiable instrument. While a "signing" may be by the use of any name or
even by a word or mark, there must be some "signing" before a person will
be liable on the instrument. 133 In Lassiter v. Rotogravure Committee, Inc. 134
a contract was signed in the following form:
PRINT COMPANY NAME EXACTLY AS IT SHOULD AP-
PEAR IN THE ROTOGRAVURE:
TURTLE CREEK RACQUET CLUB
Address, Zip 10th Floor Two Turtle Creek Village
Telephone 528-3643
Print Signature LARRY R. LASSITER
Signature /s < LARRY R. LASSITER 135
In an action against Lassiter in his personal capacity, he sought to intro-
duce parol evidence that he had intended to sign only in a representative
capacity as president of the company. 136 Although the case involved a con-
tract rather than an instrument, the court analogized the situation to the
Code provisions dealing with signatures made in a representative capacity
137
and concluded that, as between the immediate parties to the transaction,
parol evidence could be introduced to show that the contract had been
signed in a representative capacity.' 38 Drawing from a series of earlier sec-
127. Id. The sum certain includes any interest provided for in the note. Kucel v. Walter E.
Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67, 71 (5th Cir. 1987).
128. Simply because an instrument is nonnegotiable does not mean that the obligor is auto-
matically relieved of liability. E.g., Hardeman v. Parish, 730 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (obligors estopped from enforcing condition precedent by participation
in failure to fulfill the condition); Mauricio v. Mendez, 723 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1987, no writ) (obligor can be liable on nonnegotiable note if defense to payment not
proven).
129. 728 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1987).
130. Id. at 37.
131. Id.
132. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
133. See id. § 3.401(a), which states, "No person is liable on an instrument unless his signa-
ture appears thereon."
134. 727 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
135. Id. at 9.
136. Id. at 9-10.
137. Id. at 9. The relevant Code provisions are contained in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 3.403(b) (c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
138. 727 S.W.2d at 10. Even though a party may have signed in a representative capacity,
he or she may still be bound if the principal was not disclosed or was not authorized to do
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tion 3.403 cases, 139 the court also concluded that part of the signer's burden
of proof was to show that the intent to sign in a representative capacity was
communicated to the other party to the contract.' 4" A dissenting opinion
criticized the majority for analogizing the case to section 3.403 and relied on
pre-Code law to reach an opposite result. 141 The majority opinion reflects a
more modem approach to this issue and should be regarded as the better
view.
In another parol evidence case142 the signer of a note was allowed to intro-
duce evidence that an instrument was signed only for the business records
purposes of the plaintiff and was never intended to be a valid note.143 This is
consistent with the ordinary contract rule that parol evidence is always ad-
missible to show that a contract never came into existence, 44 as contrasted
to the exclusion of parol evidence that seeks to contradict or vary the terms
of an otherwise valid written agreement.' 45
Another signing case' 46 involved a renewal note and guaranty agreement
signed in the following form:
Promissory note:
The Creative Cook, Inc.
by: /s/ William E. Harris, President
William E. Harris
/s/ Barbara Harris, Vice-President
Barbara Harris
Guaranty agreement:
The Creative Cook, Inc.
/s/ William E. Harris, President
William E. Harris
/s/ Barbara Harris, Vice-President
Barbara Harris 147
The court held that these were clear and unambiguous signings showing
that the individuals had signed as representatives only and that they had
incurred no personal liability for the indebtedness of the corporation. 48
business in the state. See Stacy v. Energy Management Group, Ltd., 734 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, no writ).
139. The cited cases included Griffin v. Ellinger, 538 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex. 1976); Scale v.
Nichols, 505 S.W.2d 251, 255 (Tex. 1974), and Antil v. Southwest Envelope Co,, 601 S.W.2d
47, 48 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
140. 727 S.W.2d at 11.
141. Id. at 11-12.
142. Bill Shannon, Inc. v. San Clemente, 724 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987,
no writ).
143. Id. at 942-43.
144. E.g., Baker v. Baker, 143 Tex. 191, 198, 183 S.W.2d 724, 728 (1944); Merbitz v. Great
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
145. E.g., Town North Nat'l Bank v. Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1978); Bailey v.
Gulfway Nat'l Bank, 626 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
146. Summit Bank v. The Creative Cook, 730 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987,
no writ).
147. Id. at 345.
148. Id. at 346.
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Antecedent Debt. Under § 3.303(b) of the Code149 a holder gives value
when an instrument is taken in payment of an antecedent debt. In Biggs v.
World Air Conditioning, Inc. 150 the drawer of a check made an ingenious,
but strained, argument based on section 3.408 of the Code' 51 that a holder
who had not immediately cancelled an antecedent debt in exchange for a
check had not given value for the check and was subject to a defense of
failure of consideration.1 52 The court properly noted that section 3.802 of
the Code' 53 operates to suspend the enforceability of the underlying obliga-
tion pending payment or dishonor of the check and that value is given when
the check is taken 154 under section 3.303.155 According to the court's cor-
rect interpretation of these sections, "payment" of an antecedent debt does
not require immediate cancellation of a debt to constitute value.
B. Proper Presentment and Payment of Instruments
Indorsement Not a Prerequisite to Payment. Elementary commercial law
holds that a forged indorsement is ineffective to transfer title to an instru-
ment. 1 56 Equally elementary is that a bank or other payor is liable for con-
versation if it pays an instrument over a forged indorsement. 157 If the payee
of an instrument requests payment, however, the payee may waive the re-
quirement of an indorsement since the payee is a proper party to receive
payment. 158 In this situation there is no conversion because the correct per-
son received the proceeds. 159 Of course, if a person other than the named
payee attempts to obtain payment, the bank or other payor is within its
rights to insist on the payee's indorsement and may interplead adverse claim-
ants if the actual ownership of the instrument is disputed.' 60
Payment to the Wrong Person. Another improper payment situation is that
of a maker who receives a notice and demand for payment from an assignee,
but who ignores the notice and pays the assignor instead. In this situation,
the maker is still liable to the assignee for payment of the note.161 A pay-
ment made to the wrong person does not work a discharge of the maker's
149. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.303(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
150. 722 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
151. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.408 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
152. 722 S.W.2d at 28.
153. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.802(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
154. 722 S.W.2d at 29.
155. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.303 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
156. Id. § 3.202; see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 76, at 597-603.
157. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.419 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); see J. WHITE &
R. SUMMERS, supra note 76, at 585-89.
158. Gray v. Bertrand, 723 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. 1987). If the requirement of indorse-
ment has not been waived and the proceeds are paid to the wrong person, there is a conversion.
See Ames v. Great S. Bank, 672 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. 1984). (bank held liable for cashing certifi-
cate of deposit and paying money to bookkeeper without authorization or indorsement).
159. 723 S.W.2d at 958.
160. Salazar v. San Benito Bank & Trust Co., 730 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1987, no writ).
161. BOC Group, Inc. v. Katy Nat'l Bank, 720 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th




Early Payment as Discharge of Note. In contrast to improper payment, a
situation may sometimes involve payment to a proper person at a date prior
to the due date of an instrument. If the prepayment includes an agreement
between the holder and the maker that a discount for prepayment is allowed,
the payment of the discounted amount discharges the maker from further
liability on the note. 163 In Woods v. Applemack Enterprises, Inc. 164 the court
disallowed a claim by the holder for payment of the discount after the maker
had already paid the agreed sum as full payment of the note. 165
C. Liability of Parties
Dissolution of Partnership Does Not Discharge Partners' Liability. The disso-
lution of a partnership does not discharge the partners from liability on notes
signed by them while the partnership existed unless the instruments clearly
condition liability on the continuation of the partnership. 66 The notes in-
volved were nonnegotiable and the result, therefore, did not depend on the
concept of negotiability to cut off defenses.1 67
Liability of Assignee Under FTC Holder in Due Course Rule. In Home Sav-
ings Association v. Guerra 168 the Texas Supreme Court restated its interpre-
tation of the Federal Trade Commission Holder in Due Course Rule. 169
Under that rule, all consumer credit notes and contracts must contain a no-
tice that provides, inter alia, "Recovery hereunder by the debtor shall not
exceed amounts paid by the debtor hereunder."'' 70 The court of appeals per-
mitted a recovery against the assignee of a consumer note for DTPA viola-
tions committed by the seller-assignor. 17' The supreme court reversed this
portion of the judgment and ruled that the assignee was liable only to the
extent of payments already made under the contract. 172 The court recog-
nized that an assignee might incur greater liability if it had itself committed
DTPA violations or had been " 'so inextricably intertwined in the transac-
162. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.603 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) requires that pay-
ment be made to the holder to work a discharge of the maker.
163. Id. § 3.601 discharges a party by any act or agreement that would discharge a simple
contract for the payment of money. An agreement to accept a lesser amount is an accord and
satisfaction that would discharge such a contract. See text at notes 30-40 supra.
164. 729 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
165. Id. at 331. The maker could have insisted on the return or cancellation of the note
when the payment was made to take advantage of the discharge provided in TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 3.605 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). This action would have probably saved
a lawsuit.
166. Perry v. Welch, 725 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
167. Compare the limited defenses available against a holder in due course under TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.305 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) with the panoply of defenses
available under id. § 3.306.
168. 733 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. 1987).
169. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1-.3 (1975).
170. Id. § 433.2(a).
171. Home Say. Ass'n v. Guerra, 720 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.-San Antonio), rev'd, 733
S.W.2d 134 (Tex. 1987).
172. 733 S.W.2d at 137.
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tion as to be equally responsible for the conduct of the sale.' ",173 The court
disapproved the case of De La Fuente v. Home Savings Association 174 to the
extent it contains language inconsistent with Guerra.
Proof of Liability on Summary Judgment. The holder of a note is entitled to
recover against the maker or against guarantors on a motion for summary
judgment that is supported by adequate documentary evidence of the note
and the default. 175 In 8920 Corp. v. Alief Alamo Bank 176 summary judg-
ment evidence, including the notes, a related Deed of Trust, a guaranty
agreement, and an affidavit of one of the creditor's vice-presidents, was
judged adequate documentary proof.177 A discrepancy between the name of
the vice-president in the motion and on the affidavit was held to be a minor
defect that did not affect the motion. 78 The debtor introduced no contro-
verting affidavits raising an issue of material fact.179
In Menendez v. Texas Commerce Bank 180 a judicial admission that a
party had signed a note as a guarantor precluded asserting the statute of
frauds as a defense to the guaranty agreement.' 8' The court pointed out that
the mere signing of an instrument as a guarantor automatically creates the
contract of guaranty imposed by operation of law in section 3.416 of the
Code. 182
Makers and Guarantors Have Burden of Proving Defense. In Crawford v.
Kelly Field National Bank 183 the court held that introduction of a note by
the holder put the burden of proving a defense on the makers and guarantors
and that an alleged defense of failure of consideration was not proven. 184 In
reaching this conclusion in a case tried on stipulated facts, the court relied
on section 3.307 of the Code.' 85
173. 733 S.W.2d at 136 (emphasis by the court) (quoting Knight v. International Har-
vester, 627 S.W.2d 382, 389 (Tex. 1982)). Colonial Leasing Co. v. Kinerd, 733 S.W.2d 671
(Tex. App.-Eastland 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), adds the thought that, even if the parties are
"inextricably intertwined," the plaintiff must still show that the defendant engaged in wrongful
conduct, either directly or through an agent, or ratified the conduct, before liability exists. Id.
at 673. This is a narrow reading of the concept in such cases as Mytel Int'l Inc. v. Turbo
Refrigerating Co., 689 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ), and Potere, Inc. v.
National Realty Serv., 667 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). Fur-
ther elucidation by the supreme court will be needed in this area.
174. 669 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
175. E.g., Zarges v. Beavan, 652 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex. 1983); Life Ins. Co. v. Gar-Dal,
Inc., 570 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tex. 1978); Wooldridge v. Groos Nat'l Bank, 603 S.W.2d 335, 343
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ); Guardian Bank v. San Jacinto Say. Ass'n, 593 S.W.2d
860, 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
176. 722 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
177. Id. at 719-20.
178. Id. at 720.
179. Id.
180. 730 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
181. Id. at 14-15.
182. Id. at 14, see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.416(a), (c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968).
183. 733 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
184. Id. at 628.
185. Id. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.307(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides,
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Limitation on Liability of Guarantors. In Frost National Bank v. Johnson 186
the El Paso court of appeals held that a guaranty agreement on a First Na-
tional Bank of Midland form limited the liability of a guarantor. 8 7
Two notes and the accompanying guaranty were assigned to Frost with-
out recourse and were subsequently defaulted. In an action against the guar-
antor, the court held that the language of the guaranty insulated the
guarantor from liability since all debts of the principal obligor (an oil drilling
company) had not yet been paid in full to the "Creditor," meaning the FDIC
as receiver of the First National Bank of Midland.1 88 According to the
court, the language of the guaranty was not ambiguous and meant that an
assignee could not recover on the guaranty until the original creditor had
been fully paid. 189 On this point, the court cited FDIC v. Matheson,'90 a
case construing the same language.
No Setoff by Guarantors When Setoff is Owned by Principal Debtor. While a
guarantor is entitled to assert any defenses, counterclaims, or setoffs that the
guarantor may have in his or her own right, a cause of action that belongs to
the principal debtor generally cannot be asserted by the guarantor unless the
principal debtor is a party to the suit.' 9 1 In Hart v. First Federal Savings &
Loan Association,192 the creditor sued the guarantors following a default on
a promissory note. The principal debtor, a corporation, was not joined in
the action by either the creditor or by the guarantors. The guarantors ar-
gued that the debtor had a valid DTPA claim against the creditor, but ad-
mitted that this claim had never been assigned to them. 193 The court held
that the guarantors had no standing to assert this claim as a setoff to recov-
ery by the creditor absent an assignment of the claim or joinder of the
debtor. 194 The guarantors also failed to show that they fell within any of the
exceptions to the general rule requiring joinder of the principal debtor. 19
Statute of Limitations. The statute of limitations on a demand note begins to
in part, "When signatures are admitted or established, production of the instrument entitles a
holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense."
186. 729 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
187. Id. at 320. The critical language in the agreement read: "This guaranty shall inure to
the benefit of the transferee, assignee, or holder of the principal debt; however, all indebtedness
to the Creditor shall first be paid in full, before the assignee of any debt guaranteed shall
receive any benefit of this contract of guaranty." Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 804 F.2d 1382, 1384 (5th Cir. 1986).
191. Hart v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 727 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no
writ).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 725.
194. Id. at 727.
195. The exceptions are: (1) When the debtor cannot be reached by ordinary process of
law, (2) when the debtor cannot be found, (3) when the debtor is dead, or (4) when the debtor
is actually or notoriously insolvent. These exceptions are stated in TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 17.001 (Vernon 1986).
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run on the date of execution or delivery. 196 Summary judgment in favor of
the maker is proper where the note and pleadings show on their face that
more than four years has elapsed since delivery of the instrument. 19 7
IV. BANK TRANSACTIONS
A. Relationship Between Bank and Its Customers
Ownership of Joint Accounts. One of the principal reasons for joint accounts
is to provide rights of survivorship, passing ownership of an account outside
a decedent's estate. The Texas Probate Code 198 requires there be a written
agreement, signed by the decedent, providing that upon the death of any
party, the interest of the deceased passes to the other party. Language such
as "the account 'is held as joint tenants with rights of survivorship'" has
been held sufficient to comply with the statute.1 99
In Dickerson v. Brooks2° ° a signature card and application for a savings
account clearly satisfied the requirements of the Probate Code.20 1 The bank
failed to specify on the savings certificates, however, that the accounts were
joint accounts with rights of survivorship, and the decedent did not sign the
certificates. The court held this omission was immaterial because the dece-
dent had signed the signature card and this signing was adequate to satisfy
the statutory requirements. 202
A second issue in the case was whether a note issued to the decedent or,
upon her death, to specified heirs was a valid nontestamentary transfer of
any balance due on the note. 20 3 The court held that the language of the note
was sufficient to satisfy section 450 of the Texas Probate Code2° 4 permitting
certain instruments to operate as nontestamentary transfers. 20 5 A dissenting
opinion disagreed with the majority on both issues.20 6
B. Setoff of Bank Accounts
When is a Setoff not a Setoff? While a bank must exercise its rights of setoff
196. McCraine v. Manz, 730 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ); see TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.122(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
197. 730 S.W.2d at 367.
198. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a) (Vernon 1980).
199. Chopin v. InterFirst Bank Dallas, N.A., 694 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
200. 727 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
201. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a) (Vernon 1980).
202. 727 S.W.2d at 654.
203. Id.
204. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 450 (Vernon 1980).
205. 727 S.W.2d at 654. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 450(a) (Vernon 1980) provides, in part:
Any of the following provisions in [a] ... promissory note ... is deemed to be
nontestamentary, and this code does not invalidate the instrument or any
provision:
(1) that money or other benefits theretofore due to, controlled, or owned by a
decedent shall be paid after his death to a person designated by the decedent in
either the instrument or a separate writing, including a will, executed at the
same time as the instrument or subsequently ....
206. 727 S.W.2d at 654-55.
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with caution,207 a direction by its depositor in the form of a check to apply
the amount of the check to outstanding loans made to the customer is not a
setoff, much less a wrongful setoff.208 According to the court in Porter v.
Security State Bank,209 the bank was legally obligated to pay a check drawn
by its customer and to apply the amount to the indicated loan. 210 Under
these circumstances, there was no evidence to show a wrongful setoff and a
directed verdict in favor of the bank was proper. 211
Liability for Improper Setoff. In contrast to the decision in Porter, a bank
may not setoff against funds that it knows are held in trust by its deposi-
tor.212 In a fact situation that would be comic had it not led to serious
consequences, 213 a bank failed to follow instructions accompanying a wire
transfer and put the funds into the wrong account. When the bank discov-
ered its error, it sought to reimburse itself by setting off against trust funds
held by its depositor. At the same time, the bank took twenty-six hours in
redirecting a wire transfer order from a suburban branch to its downtown
office (although no finding was requested or found that this was the bank's
fault). The "For want of a nail" nature of the case was heightened by a
backdrop of high-speed transactions between the depositor (an oil field
equipment broker) and various buyers and sellers. After these errors came
to light, the bank refused to return the amount of the offset and this refusal
in turn caused the customer to be unable to repay a large part of an escrow
deposit. The net result was ruination of the reputation of the customer and
it was forced to go out of business. In a wrongful setoff action against the
bank for negligence, conversion and breach of contract, 214 the customer re-
covered both actual and punitive damages, including recovery for lost profits
207. E.g., Reed v. Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Co., 655 S.W.2d 259, 261-64 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (setoff against trust funds held improper); Collin County
Say. & Loan v. Miller Lumber Co., 653 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ)
(setoff against trust funds disallowed); see Annotation, Bank's Right to Apply Third Person's
Funds, Deposited in Debtor's Name, on Debtor's Obligation, 8 A.L.R.3d 235, 239 (1966). Even
a proper setoff must be exercised before the depositor has effectively withdrawn the funds.
MBank Brenham v. Barrera, 721 S.W.2d 840, 841-42 (Tex. 1986). Under the equitable setoff
rule adopted in Texas, the bank must also show that it changed its position to its detriment in
reliance on the setoff. See Citibank v. Interfirst Bank, 784 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1986) (bank must
show change in position in reliance on depositor's continued ownership of funds); National
Indem. Co. v. Spring Branch State Bank, 348 S.W.2d 528, 529-31 (Tex. 1961) (change of
position in reliance is essential element of valid setoff).
208. Porter v. Security State Bank, 721 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 559.
211. Id. at 559-60.
212. E.g., Reed v. Valley Fed. Say. & Loan Co., 655 S.W.2d 259, 261-64 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (setoff against trust funds held improper); Collin County
Sav. & Loan v. Miller Lumber Co., 653 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ)
(setoff against trust funds disallowed).
213. Allied Bank West Loop v. C.B.D. & Assoc., Inc., 728 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
214. The bank's case was not helped by evidence that, when the depositor demanded return
of the offset funds, the bank officers responded by saying, "Well, we made a mistake, and that
is the way we elected to correct the mistake, and the money is not going back in," and, "Maybe
we can't [setoff against a trust account], but we did." Id. at 58.
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for a twenty-month period. 215
C. Liability to Payees
Late Return of Items. The Texas law has been clear for some time that the
failure of a payor bank to dishonor or return an item by its midnight dead-
line will make the bank accountable under section 4.302 of the Code216 for
the amount of the item.217 A subsidiary question, however, is "When does
the midnight deadline start to run?" This question is easy to answer when
only one bank is involved, but what if the bank has contracted with a data
processing center to handle the initial computer processing with subsequent
delivery of the checks and accounting data to the bank for review? In First
State Bank v. American Bank,2 18 the court believed that considerations of
the need for speed in the collection process and the need for a rule to prevent
a bank from favoring itself in the collection process over the owners of items
tipped the balance in favor of holding that the midnight deadline starts to
run when the checks are presented to the data processing center. 219 The
court also found this was the rule adopted in the majority of cases that had
decided this issue. 220
V. LETTERS OF CREDIT
A. Presentment Requirements
Strict Compliance--Slippage in the Joints? While courts continue to recite
the litany that strict compliance is necessary for a proper presentment under
a letter of credit,22 ' the cynical reader may be increasingly entitled to look
askance at the application of this phrase. In Breathless Associates v. First
Savings & Loan Association,222 the court considered a situation involving
two letters of credit, Nos. 4-52 and 4-53. Both credits required the benefici-
ary to present an original promissory note issued by named persons in speci-
fied amounts and dated April 28, 1983.223 Under No. 4-52 the note that was
presented was correct in all respects except for being dated April 29, 1983.
Under No. 4-53 the date and maker were correct, but there were two notes
instead of one, although they added up to the correct dollar amount.
215. Id. at 52.
216. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.302(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
217. E.g., Hamby Co. v. Seminole State Bank, 652 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tex. 1983); Union
Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 621 F.2d 790, 795-96 (5th Cir. 1980); Pecos County State Bank v. El
Paso Livestock Auction Co., 586 S.W.2d 183, 186-87 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). A bank may also become accountable for the amount of an item if it is not
returned by a clearinghouse deadline under the final payment rule of TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 4.213(a)(3) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). See Lockhart Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Republic
Bank Austin, 720 S.W.2d 193, 194-96 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
218. 732 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
219. Id. at 406-07.
220. Id. at 406.
221. E.g., Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 707 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1983);
Dubose Steel, Inc. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 72 N.C. App. 598, 324 S.E.2d 859 (1985);
Temple-Eastex Inc. v. Addison Bank, 672 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1984).
222. 654 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
223. Id. at 834.
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The issuer dishonored the demand for payment under both credits and the
beneficiary sued. Since the question of whether a presentment complies with
the terms of a credit is a matter of law for the court unless the credit is
patently ambiguous, 224 the court considered the issue on a motion for sum-
mary judgment.225 According to the court, the issue was whether the dis-
crepancy was one that might indicate even a "slightly increased risk of
nonperformance or fraud by the beneficiary. ' 226 Applying this standard, the
court believed the incorrect date on the promissory note presented under
No. 4-52 "could have no relevance whatever to performance by Plaintiff. '227
Under No. 4-53, however, the discrepancy could not have resulted from in-
advertence or typographical error and might indicate an increased risk of
fraud or nonperformance. 228 The dishonor under No. 4-53 was, therefore,
proper.229
In Willow Bend National Bank v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp.,230 the
court considered a credit that specified, inter alia, "[t]he amount of the draft
must be endorsed on reverse hereof by negotiating bank. '231 Instead of
presenting the draft through a negotiating bank, the beneficiary presented a
draft in proper form directly to the issuing bank. 232 The court held that the
presentment was nonetheless proper because the language in the credit did
not require presentment through a negotiating bank, but only specified the
manner of indorsement if the draft were so presented.233 The court did not
view the credit as creating a condition that presentment had to be through a
negotiating bank because conditions that work a forfeiture are disfavored
and will be construed as such only if no other reading of the contract is
reasonable. 234
B. Amendment of Credits
Extension of Expiration Date. In another letter of credit case,235 the princi-
pal issue was whether an agreement between the issuer and the beneficiary
could effectively extend the coverage under the credit by modification of the
expiration date by which documents were to be presented. A bank officer
advised the beneficiary that the credit could be extended by such an agree-
ment, but when a presentment was made under the extension date, it was
dishonored. In an action between the beneficiary and the bank, the court
held that the beneficiary and the issuer could not change the terms of the
224. E.g., Westwind Exploration v. Homestate Sav. Ass'n, 696 S.W.2d 378, 381 (Tex.
1985).
225. 654 F. Supp. at 835.
226. Id. at 837.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 837-38.
230. 722 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).




235. Fina Supply, Inc. v. Abilene Nat'l Bank, 726 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. 1987).
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credit without the agreement of the account party,236 citing section 5.106 of
the Code. 237 Presentment under the extension date was not, therefore, in
strict compliance with the terms of the original credit and dishonor was
proper. 238 The court also held that the representation by the bank officer
was a statement of opinion as to legal effect only and was not a statement of
fact that would support an action for fraud.239
C. Actions Against Beneficiaries
Fraud in the Transaction. Another issue that has been the subject of fre-
quent litigation in letter of credit cases is whether there has been such fraud
in the transaction between the beneficiary and the customer to justify an
injunction against honor by the issuer.24° The verbal formula applied in
such cases is that the fraud must be so "egregious" as to "vitiate" the trans-
action. 241 In Paris Savings & Loan Association v. Walden 242 the trial court
issued a temporary injunction against honor. 243 On appeal, the court held
that the "fraud," if any, did not rise to the level needed to enjoin honor
because the activity involved was regarded by the parties as an investment
activity carrying a degree of risk without guarantee of success. 2 " In the
cases considered by the court24 5 in which the court found fraud in the trans-
action, the beneficiary had deliberately manipulated the transaction to pro-
vide worthless goods. In this case, efforts to comply had been made and the
failures were not deliberate, but resulted from an overly optimistic assess-
236. Id. at 541-42.
237. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.106(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
238. 726 S.W.2d at 542.
239. Id. at 540-41. A misrepresentation of fact is actionable under the DTPA. See Int'l
Nickel Co. v. Trammel Crow Distrib. Corp., 833 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1986) (misrepresentation
by warehouse that it was conducting inventory checks held actionable). Statements of opinion
about legal effect can be actionable if the plaintiff qualifies as a consumer under the DTPA.
See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(12) (Vernon 1987).
240. E.g., Phillip Bros., Inc. v. Oil Country Specialists, Ltd., 709 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ); GATX Leasing Corp. v. DBM Drilling Corp., 657 S.W.2d
178 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ); Siderius, Inc. v. Wallace Co., 583 S.W.2d 852
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
241. E.g., Phillip Bros., Inc. v. Oil Country Specialists, Ltd., 709 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ); Tandy Brands, Inc. v. Master Mktg. Ass'n, 481 So.
2d 925, 926 (Fla. App. 1985). The stringent requirements to enjoin honor are consistent with
the general purpose of a letter of credit. As the court said in CKB & Assocs. v. Moore McCor-
mack Petroleum, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. 1987):
The very object of a letter of credit is to provide a near foolproof method of
placing money in the beneficiary's hands when he complies with the terms of the
letter itself. Parties to a contract may use a letter of credit in order to make
certain that contractual disputes wend their way towards resolution with money
in the beneficiary's pocket rather than in the pocket of the contracting party.
Id. at 655 (citation omitted).
242. 730 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ dismissed).
243. Id. at 356.
244. Id. at 364. The activity involved was the implantation of cattle embryos for cattle
production.
245. United Bank, Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 360 N.E.2d
943, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976); Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31
N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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ment of the current state of genetic engineering. 246
Breach of Transfer Warranties. In Delta Brands, Inc. v. Bank Dallas,
N.A. ,247 a confirming bank sought to recover the amount paid under a letter
of credit to the beneficiary. The bank alleged the beneficiary had breached a
warranty under section 5.111 of the Code24 8 that the documents conformed
to the terms of the credit. 249 The court found no cases construing section
5.111 in the context of an alleged warranty breach running to a confirming
bank, but did discuss cases involving warranties running to issuing banks.250
The court concluded that a confirming bank was a protected party under the
warranty of section 5.111 and held that a beneficiary warrants to both a
confirming and an issuing bank that the documents presented under a credit




A. Perfection of Security Interests
Security Interests in Bankruptcy. Once again, the failure to file a financing
statement 252 or the failure to properly complete a financing statement 25 3
gave the trustee in bankruptcy an opportunity to avoid security interests
under section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code. 254 Of considerably more impor-
tance, however, was the addition of a new chapter 12 to the Bankruptcy
Code2 55 governing the bankruptcy of family farmers. 256 Under chapter 12, a
family farmer has an opportunity to reorganize a farming operation free of
some of the restrictions applicable to reorganization plans under chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code.25 7 The rejection of the "absolute priority rule" 258
246. Paris Say. & Loan, 730 S.W.2d at 364.
247. 719 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
248. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.11 l(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides: "Un-
less otherwise agreed the beneficiary by transferring or presenting a documentary draft or
demand for payment warrants to all interested parties that the necessary conditions of the
credit have been complied with. This is in addition to any warranties arising under Chapters
3, 4, 7, and 8."
249. 719 S.W.2d at 358.
250. Id. at 358-59. The court discussed First Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Stathis, 115 Ill. App.
3d 403, 71111. Dec. 145, 450 N.E.2d 833 (1st Dist. 1983), and First Nat'l City Bank v. Klatzer,
28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 497 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
251. 719 S.W.2d at 359.
252. In re First City Mortgage Co., 69 Bankr. 765 (Bankr. N.C. Tex. 1987) (failure to file
financing statement; security interest subordinate to trustee as hypothetical lien creditor).
253. Navarro v. IBM Corp., 70 Bankr. 94 (Bankr. N.C. Tex. 1987) (failure adequately to
describe collateral in financing statement; financing statement held ineffective to perfect secur-
ity interest).
254. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
255. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmers Bankruptcy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986), codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231 (Supp. IV
1986).
256. "Family farmer" is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(17) (Supp. IV 1986).
257. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
258. The absolute priority rule gives unsecured creditors the power to prevent confirmation
of a reorganization plan if the debtor retains an equity interest in the business. The rule is
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). In an agricultural context, this rule
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and the modification of the standards for measuring "adequate protec-
tion"259 are two of the most striking changes in bankruptcy law made by
chapter 12.260
The legislative history underlying the modification of the adequate protec-
tion standards influenced the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Timbers
of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd. ,261 a chapter 11 case,2 6 2 to reject the ade-
quate protection standards previously announced by the Ninth Circuit in In
re American Mariner.263 The details of the differences in the treatment of
adequate protection under the two cases is beyond the scope of this Article,
but the result of the differences can be briefly summarized. Under American
Mariner a secured creditor was entitled to receive periodic payments for in-
terest or lost opportunity costs following the filing of a chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy petition to compensate the creditor for loss of use of the secured
collateral. 26 4 Under Timbers, no such payments were required.265 The deci-
sion in Timbers created a significant conflict between the circuits on the issue
of adequate protection under the Bankruptcy Code and the Supreme Court
subsequently affirmed the Timbers result.266
Continuation of Perfection After Interstate Movement of Collateral. Section
9.103 of the Code267 governs the perfection of security interests in multi-
state transactions. In Allegheny International Credit Corp. v. Sega!268 the
court held that a security interest properly perfected in another jurisdiction
retained its perfected status in Texas where the secured party refiled a fi-
nancing statement within four months after the removal of the goods to
Texas. 269 The security interest was held to have priority over the competing
claims of other secured creditors who had acquired interests in the goods
after the first security interest was properly perfected.2 70
B. Priorities
Priorities of Interests in Oil and Gas. In an interesting decision, 271 the East-
meant that a farmer could not retain an equity in the farm over the objection of unsecured
creditors who were not paid.
259. The concept of adequate protection is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 361 (Supp. IV 1986).
That section is made inapplicable in farm bankruptcy cases brought under Chapter 12 by 11
U.S.C.A. § 1205(a) (Supp. 1988).
260. Chapter 12 has been described by some bankruptcy judges as "pro-debtor legislation."
Super Saver Weekly Shopping Guide, Nov. 11, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
261. 808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, sub nonm United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of In-
wood Forest Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2459, 95 L. Ed. 2d 868 (1987), aff'd, 98 L. Ed. 2d 740
(1988).
262. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (Supp. IV 1986).
263. 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984).
264. 734 F.2d at 435.
265. 808 F.2d at 363-64.
266. 98 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1988).
267. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.103 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
268. 735 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
269. Id. at 555.
270. Id. at 553-55.




land court of appeals ruled that extracted oil and gas are goods under section
9.105 of the Code272 and that a security interest in them can be perfected by
possession.273 The court also interpreted section 13.001 of the Texas Prop-
erty Code274 to be a nonsubstantive revision of the former statute,275 with
the effect that the claim of a secured creditor was subordinated to the claim
of an oil operator that had perfected its claim by possession and whose lien
for expenses was binding on the secured party even though unrecorded be-
cause of references to the lien in the chain of title.276 A claim by the secured
party that it held the earliest perfection in the oil and gas and was therefore
entitled to priority was deemed waived by failure to raise the issue at trial
and by the failure to seek findings of fact on this issue. 277
Priorities in Inventory. One of the problems that haunts secured creditors is
the dual use of property and the concomitant difficulties of classification. 278
In Stone Fort National Bank v. Citizens State Bank,279 the court found that a
tractor used by a debtor for excavation work on the debtor's property was
also regarded by the debtor as being available for sale as part of the debtor's
equipment business. 280 A secured creditor who had perfected a security in-
terest in the tractor as equipment was held not to have priority in the tractor
as inventory.281
In Crocker National Bank v. TO. S. Industries, Inc. ,282 the court held that
a security interest covering after-acquired inventory was subordinate to the
claim of a seller who retained possession of goods ordered, but not delivered,
to the debtor.283 The court reasoned that the debtor never obtained suffi-
cient rights in the collateral to permit attachment of the after-acquired prop-
erty clause of the inventory financer to create rights superior to those of the
seller who retained possession. 284
In contrast to the decision in Crocker, the court in Teton International v.
First National Bank,28 5 held that a secured creditor with an unperfected se-
curity interest in inventory had priority over the claim of manufacturers who
delivered goods to the debtor without obtaining a security interest in
272. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.105(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp.
1988).
273. 723 S.W.2d at 253.
274. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001 (Vernon 1985).
275. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6627 (Vernon 1969), repealed by Acts 1983, 68th
Leg. p. 3729, Ch. 576, § 6, Jan. 1, 1984.
276. 723 S.W.2d at 250.
277. Id. at 253.
278. See 8 W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES 259-61 (1986); T.
QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST 9-109[A][1]
(Supp. No. 1, 1987).
279. 722 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ).
280. Id. at 510.
281. Id.
282. 660 F. Supp. 186 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
283. Id. at 191-92.
284. Id. Regarding the time at which the debtor obtains rights in the collateral, see 8 W.
HAWKLAND, supra note 278, at 456; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 76, at 917.
285. 718 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
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them.28 6 The manufacturers, at best, were mere unsecured creditors. 287
C. Proceedings After Default
Notice of Disposition of Collateral. In Carroll v. General Electric Credit
Corp. ,288 the secured creditor sued two guarantors to recover the balance
due after a note went into default and after the collateral was repossessed.
While the suit was pending, a notice of public sale of the collateral was given
to one of the guarantors. Summary judgment against the guarantors was
granted in the pending action before the date of public sale. After the sale
was held, the creditor filed an affidavit to credit the judgment with the
amount of the sale proceeds. The court held that this sequence of events
allowed the creditor to both retain the collateral and still sue for the entire
amount of the debt, a position that it regarded as violative of Tanenbaum v.
Economic Laboratories, Inc.28 9 The court also held that the creditor had
"the burden of proving notice of sale and commercially reasonable disposi-
tion of collateral. ' 290 In the court's view, this burden had not been met and
the court remanded the case.291
In another notice case292 the court held that whether the debtors received
adequate notice of a proposal to retain collateral in satisfaction of a debt
presented a question of fact precluding an instructed verdict in favor of the
debtors. 293 Two aspects of this issue were whether the notices were properly
addressed and whether the debtors had "actual notice" of the disposition
(retention) of the collateral. 294 The decision is not clear on how actual no-
tice would satisfy the statutory requirement of "written notice" in section
9.505 of the Code. 295 Had the case involved disposition by resale under sec-
286. Id. at 840.
287. Id. The manufacturers in this case could easily have qualified for purchase money
security interest protection. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.107, .312(c) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon Supp. 1988).
288. 734 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
289. 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982).
290. Carroll, 734 S.W.2d at 155 (citing Sunjet, Inc. v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 703 S.W.2d
285 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ), discussed in Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, An-
nual Survey of Texas Law, 41 Sw. L.J. 173, 198 (1987)).
291. Id. at 155. While the court is on solid ground about the burden of proof matter, the
decision may be questioned in its interpretation of Tanenbaum v. Economics Laboratory, Inc.,
628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982), since it does not address the issue of how TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 9.501(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) fits into the case. That section provides,
inter alia, "The rights and remedies referred to in this subsection are cumulative." Id. An
argument can certainly be made that this sentence rejects an election of remedies doctrine and
allows a secured party to move forward simultaneously with all available remedies. It does not
appear inherently wrongful for a secured party to conduct a sale during the pendency of an
action for the debt or even after judgment has been entered, provided it otherwise complies
with the notice and disposition provisions of TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968). Nonetheless, the court seemed to view such action as one of the evils
that Tanenbaum sought to avoid. On the election of remedies issues, see Bennett v. State Nat'l
Bank, 623 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1981, no writ), and Unicut, Inc.
v. Texas Commerce Bank, 704 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
292. Carroll v. Kennon, 734 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, no writ).
293. Id. at 40.
294. Id. at 41.
295. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.505(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1988)
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tion 9.504 of the Code, 296 the court could have cited MBank Dallas v. Sun-
belt Manufacturing, Inc.297 to support at least an oral notice rule and,
perhaps, an actual notice rule.298 Section 9.505, however, unlike section
9.504, is explicit in its requirement of written notice and the court did not
discuss this difference. 299
Disposition of Accounts Receivable. In contrast to the hazards faced by a
secured party who seeks to resell tangible collateral, the disposition of intan-
gible collateral like accounts and chattel paper is simple. In Cullen Frost
Bank v. Dallas Sportswear Co.,3°° after default, the secured party properly
accelerated the debt and directed the debtor to deposit all proceeds from the
collection of accounts receivable in a special bank account under the control
of the secured party. A representative of the secured party was also to be
permitted on the debtor's premises to review the debtor's operation and col-
lections. Ultimately, the entire debt was paid. The supreme court held the
secured party had acted properly under section 9.502 of the Code,30 1 gov-
erning collection of accounts and chattel paper, because section contained no
requirement paralleling the section 9.504 requirement of notice before
disposition.30 2
This collection technique should be included in security agreements cover-
ing security interests in accounts, chattel paper, and instruments.
D. Sales Tax Implications of Foreclosures
Sales Tax Provisions on Debt Collection. Under section 151.0036 of the Tax
provides, inter alia: "[A] secured party in possession may, after default, propose to retain the
collateral in satisfaction of the obligation. Written notice of such proposal shall be sent to the
debtor... "
296. Id. § 9.504(c) provides, in part: "[R]easonable notification of the time and place of
any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other
intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor ... 
297. 710 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
298. Id. at 635-36.
299. Equity might nonetheless support the court's position since it seems to smack of form
over substance to require that written notice be given to someone who already has actual
notice. But see MBank Dallas v. Sunbelt Manuf., Inc., 710 S.W.2d 633, 635-36 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), on which the court recognized the difference between TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1988) and id. § 9.505(b) on
the type of notice required by the statute. In Carroll, however, the court was at least trying to
apply the correct rules. The same cannot be said of Stra, Inc. v. Seafirst Commercial Corp.,
727 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ), in which the court made no
mention of the deficiency bar rule of Tanenbaum v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 628 S.W.2d
769 (Tex. 1982), but instead cited and relied on the pre-Tanenbaum case of O'Neil v. Mack
Trucks, Inc., 533 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 542
S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1976), mandate recalled and reissued, 551 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. 1977), applying
the presumption rule specifically rejected by Tanenbaum. Stra is simply wrong on this point
and should be overruled.
300. 730 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1987).
301. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.502 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1988).
302. 730 S.W.2d at 669-70. On the notice issue, the Court said, "Notice to the debtor is
not required when the secured party collects directly from the account debtor. We hold that
when the collection is indirect and the debtor is collecting the accounts for the secured party,
prior notice is not required." 730 S.W.2d at 670.
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Code,303 "debt collection service" is defined as an "activity to collect a debt
or claim, to adjust a debt or claim, or to repossess property subject to a
claim. ' 30 4 The only exception specified in the statute provides that " '[d]ebt
collection service' does not include the collection of a judgment by an attor-
ney or by a partnership or professional corporation of attorneys if the attor-
ney, partnership, or corporation represented the person in the suit from
which the judgment arose." °30 5 The Tax Code defines "taxable services" to
include "debt collection services."'306 While the statutory language is broad
enough to include prejudgment debt collection activities by attorneys, the
attorney-general has ruled that the legislative history indicates the legislature
did not intend to make legal services subject to the sales tax. 30 7
303. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0036 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
304. Id. § 151.0036(a).
305. Id. § 151.0036(b).
306. Id. § 151.009(a)(8).
307. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. TM-823 (Nov. 30, 1987).
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